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PREFERENCE LIENS FOR THE COSTS
OF REPAIRING SLUM PROPERTY
Housing codes set standards for the operation and maintenance of res-
idential housing. Their purpose is to halt deterioration and to insure that
conditions dangerous to health and safety do not develop. The great po-
tential of housing codes was recognized by Congress, which made the
adoption and enforcement of such codes a prerequisite to participation
in the federal urban renewal programs.' Housing codes are essentially pre-
ventive rather than remedial, and are thus particularly adaptable to the
task of preserving urban areas. Housing code enforcement is designed to
stimulate expenditure of private funds and thereby supplement expensive
public programs. Most important, housing codes are local programs which
can be adapted to solve the unique problems in various American urban
centers. "Without question, the failure to enact, improve, soundly admin-
ister, and effectively enforce adequate local codes, more than any other
single cause, accounts for the huge tasks of the present urban renewal ef-
fort.2
Housing code enforcement has been inadequate, as reflected by the
frightening increase in blighted areas in recent years.' Low wage scales,
poorly trained personnel, weak criminal sanctions against violators, scarcity
of inspectors, and inspections on a complaint basis only are some of the rea-
sons why enforcement has been ineffective.' To overcome these problems
1. Rhyne, The Workable Program-A Challenge for Community Improvement, 25
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 685, 686 (1960).
2. Osgood & Zwerner, Rehabilitation and Conservation, 25 LAw & CoNT MP. PRoB.
705, 719 (1960) (emphasis added).
3. [WMIe 'Boston's urban renewal program has made discernible progress . ..
the rate of renewal activity still is being outstriped by the rate of decay.... 22,000
more dwellings have fallen into the sub-standard category. This is nearly three
times the amount of poor housing eliminated in the last ten years.' What is true in
Boston is true in virtually every urban area in the United States. Leach, The Fed-
eral Urban Renewal Program: A Ten-Year Critique, 25 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 777-78
(1960) (emphasis added).
4. Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L. R.v. 801 (1965).
In general, enforcement of housing codes has two goals: to bring about correction of
violations and to deter would-be violators. Criminal sanctions would appear to be the
most effective means of achieving these goals. However, criminal sanctions in the form
of fines and imprisonment have failed to accomplish either of these goals with the con-
sistency necessary to arrest and eliminate urban blight.
Imposition of fines raises several problems. First, the size of the fine must be deter-
mined by balancing two nearly irreconcilable considerations. On the one hand, the fine
must not be so large that it leaves the slum owner no funds with which to finance repairs.
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of housing code enforcement two relatively new methods of code enforce-
ment--direct municipal repairs laws and receivership proceedings-are
being used by some municipalities.'
A receivership law usually provides that when the owner of a building
in which there are serious housing code violations refuses to repair the
structure in conformity with city regulations, the local housing code com-
missioner can petition in equity to have the city or a private agent appointed
as a receiver for the property.6 The appointed receiver collects the rents
and income from the property, which are used to pay for basic repairs.
Thus the court becomes the overseer of the property's rehabilitation under
the receivership program. Under a direct municipal repair law, when a
recalcitrant landlord refuses, after due notice, to take any steps toward ef-
fecting renovation of his property, city housing officials simply contract to
have basic repairs made. The costs of these repairs becomes a lien on the
property in favor of the city if the owner refuses to pay for them. This
program involves no court action, but rather direct municipal action to
alleviate slum conditions.
City governments cannot afford to defray the costs of rehabilitating the
large amount of slum property present in most urban areas.7 The expend-
itures of receivers appointed by courts or of city governments under direct
On the other hand, it must not be so small that it is no real deterrent to future violations.
The courts are generally hesitant to impose severe fines on landlords, because, all too of-
ten, the accused's property is in no worse condition than are myriad other dwellings in
the community. To make an example of one unfortunate property owner who was the
victim of sporadic inspection and enforcement procedures is obviously unjust. In addi-
tion, both the courts and the community often look upon housing code violations as
something less than morally reprehensible. Thus, there is often no public demand for
stiff penalties, and only weak ones are imposed as a result. However, even if fines are
levied, many slum property owners view them as no more than operating expenses which
are much cheaper than repairs. HousE COMM. ON SLUM HOUSING AND RENT GOUoING,
74th Ill. Gen. Assembly 3 (Comm. Print 1965). In the Illinois investigation, tenants'
complaints-which, at best, elicited only sporadic action by landlords-were found to be
the primary impetus for making repairs. Pressure by tenants may, however, be nugatory,
since landlords can retaliate against complaining tenants with higher rents or even evic-
tion. Richey, Tenant Oppression: Our Smoldering Housing Scandal, 24 ANTIOCH Rv.
337, 341 (1964).
5. HousE COMM. ON SLUM HOUSING AND RENT GouoiNO, supra note 4, at 4. The
shortcomings of present housing code enforcement are examined in Note, Enforcement of
Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HLv. L. Rav. 801 (1965).
6. A receiver may be public or private. If the receiver is public, the problem of fi-
nance is the same as that involved in a direct municipal repair law, since the local munici-
pality must furnish the funds. Often, non-profit corporations serve as private receivers,
thus relieving the city of the problem of financing repairs. However, the private receiver
must have some assurance that it will be able to recoup its expenditures.
7. There is evidence that many city governments cannot even afford a full staff of in-
spectors, much less actual repairs. See Note, supra note 4, at 804-05.
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municipal repair laws must be recovered if this type of program is to be
successful. If receivers are appointed, the expenses of repair may often
exceed the rent return on the property even for long periods. The slow
recovery of repair expenses from rental income may cause the property to re-
main in receivership for an abnormally long time, or may discourage pri-
vate receivers from investing in the property. A lien on the property,
which could be foreclosed if the owner balked at paying for necessary repairs
is an obvious solution to the problem. Quite often, however, slum housing
is heavily mortgaged,' so that any secondary repair lien is practically worth-
less. Any attempt to foreclose a secondary repair lien would result in the
foreclosure of prior mortgages or other liens and leave the city government
or receiver without a remedy. Mortgagees and holders of prior liens would
have gained a windfall. Hence, any effective slum repair program involving
receivership or direct municipal repair necessitates the use of prior liens for
the rehabilitation expenses. However, if preference is given to slum repair
liens, a great number of existing encumbrances will be relegated to subor-
dinate positions. A displaced lienor may have several objections to such sub-
ordination.
If a receivership or direct municipal repair law does not give a lienor
notice of violations, opportunity to make repairs, or opportunity to show
cause why the property should not be placed in the custody of a receiver,
the lienor may contend that he has been deprived of his property without
due process of law.' However, this objection is easily met by including such
provisions.' The lienor's most significant objection to such a measure will
doubtless be that the lien provision violates the impairment of the obligations
of contracts clause of the federal constitution." Obviously, prior mortgagees'
and lienors' contracts with the owners of slum properties will be impaired by
the involuntary subordination of their liens to the lien for slum rehabilita-
tion expenses.12 If the slum repair liens are found to be an unconstitutional
impairment of the obligations of contracts, this objection cannot be over-
come without making the repair liens subordinate to existing encumbrances;
this would, of course, emasculate any slum repair program of this nature.
8. Gribetz, New York City's Receivership Law, 21 J. oF HOUSING 297, 298 (1964).
9. See Central Say. Bank v. City of New York, 279 N.Y. 266, 18 N.E.2d 151 (1938),
opinion amended, 280 N.Y. 9, 19 N.E.2d 659, cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1939).
10. The New York receivership law, N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 309 (McKinney
Supp. 1966), which provides a similar procedure, has been upheld as constitutional. In
re Department of Bldgs., 14 N.Y.2d 291, 200 N.E.2d 432, 251 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1964).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
12. This was the major objection to a 1937 New York slum repair law declared un-
constitutional in Central Say. Bank v. City of New York 279 N.Y. 266, 18 N.E.2d 151
(1938), opinion amended, 208 N.Y. 9, 19 N.E.2d 659, cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1939).
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This note examines the case law bearing upon the issue of whether prefer-
ence liens for slum repair costs are a legitimate impairment of the obligations
of contracts. First, the possibility of creating a legitimate preference lien for
the costs of direct municipal repair of slum housing WIll be explored. Then,
the use of a preference lien receivership program to defray slum repair ex-
penses will be examined.
I. PRIOR LIENS FOR COSTS OF MUNICIPAL REPAIR OF SLUM DWELLINGS
A. Central Savings-Its Current Status
In 1937, the New York legislature reacted to the shortcomings of housing
code enforcement with a hold innovation.13 The measure14 provided that
when the owner of a building with housing code violations which endan-
gered the health and safety of the occupants refused to repair the structure,
the local housing commissioner could order that the repairs be made by
the city or could let a contract to a private company. The measure's effec-
tiveness was dependent upon a provision that the costs of repairs could be
rharged as a lien against the property with preference over all prior encum-
brances except taxes." In Adamec v. Post" the law was upheld as consti-
tutional with regard to the property owner. But the provision for a prior
lien for the repair costs was struck down in Central Say. Bank v. City of
New York," when challenged by the mortgagee of a slum dwelling whose
lien on the property arose prior to the passage of the statute. The Appellate
Division'8 held that the receivership costs could be imposed as an exercise
of state taxation power, since any property tax may interdict existing mort-
gages without running afoul of the impairment clause. The New York
Court of Appeals, however, held that the slum repair measure violated the
mortgagee's constitutional guarantee of due process of law and impaired
the obligations of his contract with the property owner. The Court of Ap-
peals found that the assessment for municipal repair of a slum dwelling was
a police power assessment, not an exercise of taxation power.'9 Taxes must
be in invitum.2" The receivership lien was held not in invitum, because an
13 See 52 HIv. L. Rav. 684 (1939).
14. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 353.
15. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 353, § 3.
16. 273 N.Y. 250, 7 N.E.2d 120 (1937).
17. 279 N.Y. 266, 18 N.E.2d 151 (1938), opinion amended, 280 N.Y. 9, 19 N.E.2d
659, cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1939).
18. Central Say. Bank v. City of New York, 254 App. Div. 502, 5 N.Y.S.2d 451
(1938).
19. Central Say. Bank v. City of New York, 279 N.Y. 266, 280-81, 18 N.E.2d 151,
156-57 (1938), opinion amended, 280 N.Y. 9, 19 N.E.2d 659, cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661
(1939).
20. Id. at 280, 18 N.E.2d at 156.
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operator of a slum dwelling can simply close his building and avoid the
assessment." Thus, the court reasoned that this assessment was an exer-
cise of the state's police power.2 Furthermore, the 1937 slum repair law was
designed to regulate the condition of the dwellings, not to raise revenues.
In holding the municipal repair law unconstitutional, the New York
court distinguished an earlier Massachusetts decision which held that an
assessment for water liens could be given statutory priority over liens in
existence at the time the statute was passed. The New York court said
that mortgagees could not have anticipated the receivership program,
whereas the water rental provision could have been anticipated. 4 The
court seemed to emphasize the retroactive effect of the statute, leaving open
the question of the validity of a statute which operates only prospectively.25
Furthermore, in distinguishing the Massachusetts decision, the New York
court ignored the following language:
The primary and fundamental inquiry is whether the interests of the
public require the improvement. When that inquiry is answered in the
affirmative, and the means adopted are reasonable, private rights must
yield.... Private property, including contract rights and real and per-
sonal estate, is held subject to the lawful exercise of the police power. 6
In addition to the earlier Massachusetts case, later cases involving prefer-
ence liens for police power assessments cast doubt on the New York Court
of Appeals' conclusion that the lien for slum repair costs was an unconstitu-
tional impairment of the obligations of contracts."
A year after Central Savings, a New York trial court interpreted that
case as not invalidating the provision for a preference lien for the costs in-
curred by a city in the demolition of unsafe buildings." The 1937 slum
repair law and the demolition measure were distinguished by the court on
three grounds: (1) the demolition lien provision required notice to mort-
21. Id.
22. In Provident Institution for Saw. v. Jersey City, 113 U.S. 506 (1884), the United
States Supreme Court held that a statutory police power assessment for water rents could
create a preference lien ahead of an existing mortgage. The Court was careful to point
out that the plaintiffs lien arose after the passage of the assessment.
23. Loring v. Commissioner of Public Works, 264 Mass. 460, 163 N.E. 82 (1928).
24. Central Say. Bank v. City of New York, 279 N.Y. 266, 280, 18 N.E.2d 151, 156
(1938), opinion amended, 280 N.Y. 9, 19 N.E.2d 659, cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661
(1939).
25. Id.
26. Loring v. Commissioner of Public Works, 264 Mass. 460, 466, 163 N.E.2d 82, 85
(1928) (emphasis added).
27. State v. Gebhardt, 151 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1945); Thornton v. Chase, 175 Misc.
748, 23 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
28. Thornton v. Chase, 175 Misc. 748, 23 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
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gagees while the slum repair law did not; (2) the slum repair measure un-
fairly compelled a mortgagee to use his property for rental housing; and
(3) it went too far in its interference with contract rights as compared with
the demolition law, which could have more easily been anticipated."3
The first distinction is obviously valid. It is difficult, however, to see how
a mortgagee is compelled to repair the property at his own expense. Mort-
gagees may prevent preference liens from displacing their interests by paying
rehabilitation costs and recovering in restitutionary or breach of contract
actions against mortgagors. Most mortgages contain agreements making
the property owner responsible for the payment of encumbrances on the
property which subsequently arise. It is generally held that when a junior
lienor pays off a prior encumbrance, he is subrogated to the position of the
first lienor3
If the owner is insolvent, a mortgagee is probably in no worse position
when a slum repair measure is employed than when his building is demol-
ished. Under a slum repair measure, the mortgagee's lien, at worst, is re-
duced by the costs of basic rehabilitation. Under a constitutionally per-
missible demolition law, the mortgagee's lien, at worst, is reduced by the
value of the demolished building plus the demolition costs. If the standards
for demolition are the same as the standards for municipal repair, as in
New York, city authorities have the option of either demolishing or repair-
ing dangerous property. If repair is ordered, the mortgagee will lose more
than if demolition were ordered only in case the costs of rehabilitation
exceed the value of the structure plus the demolition costs.
However, when the costs of basic rehabilitation exceed the value of a
dangerous structure, demolition, not municipal repair, would seem to be
the appropriate remedy. If the costs of repairing a building exceed its value,
it is probably not structurally sound-an obvious prerequisite to any mu-
nicipal repair. Some ordinances allow demolition when a property has de-
teriorated to fifty per cent or less of its value." If the city can demolish an
entire building which is fifty per cent deteriorated, it should be able con-
stitutionally to repair the property and create a prior lien for the costs which
29. Id. at 749-50, 23 N.Y.S.2d at 737-38.
30. Allyn v. Dreher, 124 Neb. 342, 246 N.W. 731 (1933); Marks v. Baum Bldg. Co.,
73 Okla. 264, 175 P. 818 (1918).
31. NEw ORLEANS, LA., CITY CODE § 30-38 (1956); DALLAS, TEX., REv. CODE OF
CRIMINAL ORDINANCES: § 27-38 (1960), as amended, Dallas, Tex., Ordinance 11339,
Jan. 24, 1966; see Yen Eng v. Board of Bldg. & Safety Comm'rs, 184 Cal. App. 2d 514,
7 Cal. Rptr. 564 (1960); West Realty Co. v. Ennis, 147 Conn. 602, 164 A.2d 409
(1960); Soderfelt v. City of Drayton, 79 N.D. 742, 59 N.W.2d 502 (1953); Abraham v.
City of Warren, 67 Ohio App. 492, 37 N.E.2d 390 (1940).
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do not exceed the value of the building. The mortgagee is in the same po-
sition in either case.
In most instances, mortgagees contract with mortgagors knowing the
unsafe, unsanitary conditions of slum properties; it would be an anomaly
if those who voluntarily contracted with housing code violators were to be
protected at the expense of effective enforcement of housing laws.
The third distinction, that mortgagees could not have reasonably antic-
ipated a slum repair program, may well have had some validity in 1937.
But as suggested earlier, the failure of conventional methods of housing
code enforcement combined with serious shortages in low income housing
and the deteriorated conditions of such housing seriously weakens this ar-
gument. In addition, it is difficult to see how it is easier to anticipate the
demolition of a structure than it is to anticipate a lien for repair costs,
since both actions usually require that the structure be in an advanced
state of disrepair.2 These unconvincing distinctions suggest that the Su-
preme Court was attempting to escape the effect of Central Savings.
In the 1945 case of State v. Gebhardt,3 the Second Circuit held consti-
tutional a New York statute authorizing a prior lien on railway property
for expenses incurred by the state in making certain crossings safe, even
though the mortgage lien in that case had been created before the passage
of the law.
Central Savings was again distinguished on the ground that proper notice
was given the lienors in Gebhardt through the extensive publicity while the
law was under consideration by the legislature. Gebhardt also distinguished
Central Savings on the impairment of contracts issue:
The statue [which provides liens for expenses involved in repairing
railroad crossings] does not impair the obligation of appellant's mort-
gage contracts within the constitutional prohibition. Grade crossing
elimination has been long accepted as a valid exercise of the police
power; and this statute has already been sustained on that ground, as
well as on others, against attack by the mortgagor railroad. It is of
course settled that a state may modify contract rights in the legitimate
exercise of its police power."
It should be noted that these statements can be made about New York's
1937 municipal repair law as well. As in the New York Supreme Court
decision, the Second Circuit attempted to distinguish Central Savings on
the ground that the mortgagees of a railway could contemplate a measure
32. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 309 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
33. 151 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1945).
34. Id. at 805-06 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
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to repair dangerous grade crossings and provide for primary liens, while
the mortgagees of urban property could not anticipate a law to repair slum
property at the owner's expense."
Twenty-three years after Central Savings, the New York legislature at-
tempted to meet the Court of Appeals' objections with the 1962 Receiver-
ship Law.3" The new measure provided for the appointment of a receiver to
make repairs of slum dwellings. Under this statute mortgagees were given
notice and the opportunity to contest the receivership appointment." The
costs of repairing dilapidated dwellings incurred by a court-appointed re-
ceiver were prior liens only on the rents, not on the real estate itself as in the
earlier provision. The conditions which necessitate the appointment of a re-
ceiver were described as violations so grave as to constitute a danger to
health and safety, and, thus, a nuisance. 8 The new receivership law"0 was
held constitutional by the New York Court of Appeals in In re Department
of Bldgs.40 The notice, appeal, and opportunity-to-defend provisions in the
new law eliminated the due process objections to the 1937 law.
In two brief paragraphs the court dismissed the argument that the lien
provision unconstitutionally impaired the obligations of the mortgagee's
contract.41 First, it noted that urban blight is much more serious today than
in 1939; second, the limitation of the lien to rents was deemed much less
stringent and, therefore, more reasonable, even though the displaced lien
was in existence before the passage of the statute.4 2
Would a measure which imposed a lien on the whole property have been
found a reasonable exercise of police power? The broad language used in
35. Id. at 805. The court said, however, that Central Savings should be strictly
limited to the particular facts of that case, and took note of the law reveiw criticism
of the opinion. Id.
36. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 309 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
37. N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. LAW § 309(5)a (McKinney Supp. 1966).
38. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 309(1)a (McKinney Supp. 1966). Although this
new law results in the appointment of a receiver, it is discussed in connection with direct
municipal repair laws, because the lien on the rents under the 1962 Receivership Law
is statutory and is not the result of the issuance of receivership certificates. The signi-
ficance of the distinction between express statutory liens such as those in the 1937 New
York law and prior liens arising as a result of the issuance of receivership certificates by
equity courts will be examined in the general discussion of receivership as a method of
housing code enforcement.
39. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 309 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
40. 14 N.Y.2d 291, 200 N.E.2d 432, 251 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1964).
41. Id. at 300, 200 N.E.2d at 438-39, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 448-49.
42. The facts of the case do not make this clear although language in the opinion
indicates a retroactive application of the law.
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parts of this unanimous opinion would seem to justify a primary lien applied
to the whole property.
The same public interest which supports the statute when directed
against an owner, even though it impinges on his right to deal freely
with his property, equally justifies the legislation as a reasonable exer-
cise of the police power insofar as it affects the rights of the mortgagee."
This language would appear to support a preference lien provision whether
prospectively or retroactively applied.
Obviously spurred by the decision in In re Department of Public Build-
ings, the New York legislature recently amended its receivership law to give
the receiver a lien on the entire premises which has priority "over all other
mortgages, liens and encumbrances of record except taxes and assessments
levied pursuant to law."" The amendment indicates that the New York
legislature felt that a receivership program which allowed a lien on rents
alone is insufficient to meet the costs of housing code compliance, and that
sufficient doubt had been cast on the holding in Central Savings to enact
a statute which allows a retroactive lien on the entire property.
B. Analogous State Laws Which Displace Existing Liens
States in the exercise of their taxation powers, especially in the area of
public improvement assessments and special taxes, have imposed primary
liens on the property of mortgagors without doing violence to the inpair-
ment clause. Since public improvements theoretically increase the value of
property as much as assessment costs," some courts have reasoned that
earlier lienors suffer no damage from such tax liens." This justification,
however, does not apply to receivership liens for repair costs, which may
not increase the market price of the premises equivalently.
Nevertheless, taxes imposed upon realty, regardless of whether a par-
ticular property is directly benefited by expenditure of the tax receipts,
have been enforced to the detriment of liens in existence at the time of the
passage of the tax measure.4 In Puerto Rico v. Federal Land Bank,"' no
attempt had been made to collect property taxes more than three years
delinquent. When a law was adopted which extended the time period,
during which these taxes constituted a lien on the properties, mortgagees
43. In re Department of Bldgs., 14 N.Y.2d 291, 301, 211 N.E.2d 432, 439, 251
N.Y.S.2d 441, 449-50 (emphasis added).
44. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 309(4)a (McKinney Supp. 1966).
45. 1 PAGE & JONEs, TAXATmN By ASSESSMENT § 9, at 15 (1909).
46. Annot., 78 A.L.R. 513, 517 (1932).
47. See Puerto Rico v. Federal Land Bank, 108 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1939).
48. Id.
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claimed that enforcement would impair the obligations of their contracts.
The court found that the public welfare justified this infringement of lienors'
property rights. The power of legislatures to upset lien priorities as an
exercise of the taxation power clearly illustrates that contract rights may
be sacrificed to alleviate social and economic inequities.
The regulation and control of liens is not limited to the tax and police
powers. State legislatures as a matter of public policy have provided for
the displacement of certain liens by later encumbrances which were deemed
to merit priority. Thus, a Virginia law giving persons furnishing supplies to
railway, mining, or manufacturing companies a lien superior to earlier mort-
gages or trust deeds49 was held constitutional as applied prospectively, al-
though unconstitutional as applied retroactively. 0 A North Dakota law, 1
held constitutional, gave subsequent mechanics' liens (for materials and la-
bor furnished to build structures) priority over mortgages on the land which
were in existence when the law was enacted. 2 Under section 513 of the
New York Lien Law, materials or labor liens arising from the improvement
of real property have preference over earlier liens which have nothing to do
with the improvement of the property. When a dispute arose under this
law in 1962, its constitutionality was apparently not challenged; at least
the opinion of the court did not mention the issue." These cases illustrate
state legislatures' control over the priority of liens. Lien preferences are
not absolute rights. They must be examined in light of their consistency
with the goals of public welfare.
II. RECEIVERSHIP CERTIFICATES AS A METHOD OF FINANCING
SLUm REPAIRS
Receivers are generally appointed to maintain property while various
claims against it are being litigated or otherwise determined." The most
49. Va. Sess. Laws 1878-79, ch. 82, § 1, at 352.
50. Citizens' & Marine Bank v. Mason, 2 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1924); Crowther v.
Fidelity Ins., Trust & Safe-Deposit Co., 85 Fed. 41 (4th Cir. 1898); Virginia Dev. Co.
v. Crozer Iron Co., 90 Va. 126, 17 S.E. 806 (1893).
The Oregon Supreme Court upheld a similar statute. Haines Commercial Co. v.
Grabill, 78 Ore. 375, 152 Pac. 877 (1915). In New York, a measure which provided
that if three-fourths of the lienors agreed, a mortgage subsequent in time could take
priority over mechanics' liens, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1916, ch. 507, § 16 (now N.Y. Linx
LAW. § 29 (McKinney 1966) ), was upheld with the comment that the legislature had
created mechanics' liens and could certainly control their priority. Max Fine & Sons, Inc.
v. Lindarose, Inc., 226 App. Div. 616, 221 N.Y.S. 690 (1927).
51. N.D. Sess. Laws 1929, ch. 155.
52. Dunham Lumber Co. v. Gresz, 71 N.D. 491, 2 N.W.2d 175 (1942).
53. Betcher v. Rademacher, 35 Misc. 2d 693, 230 N.Y.S.2d 535 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
The controversy in this case centered around the powers of referees in foreclosure pro-
cedings.
54. H. McCLINTOcx, Equrry § 211 (2d ed. 1948).
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frequent use of the receiver is found in bankruptcy and foreclosure pro-
ceedings. The power of an equity court to appoint a receiver in these sit-
uations is a function of the general equity power and is not dependent on
any statutory authority." A difficulty may arise, however, when a receiver
is appointed to aid in the enforcement of a housing code ordinance. The
crux of the problem lies in the maxims that equity will not enjoin the corn-
mision of a crime, 6 and that punishment for past acts in relation to property
is a matter of criminal, not equitable, procedure. 7 The appointment of a
receiver to collect rents and make repairs does not fall squarely within
either of these equitable maxims because the court neither enjoins the com-
mission of a crime nor punishes the slum owner for past acts. Yet, since
the effect of the appointment of a receiver is to force compliance with a
housing code ordinance, there is some doubt whether the traditional equity
powers are sufficient to give a court jurisdiction in these cases.5
Local officials can be given statutory authority to petition an equity court
for the appointment of a receiver of slum property. This approach was
taken in an Illinois statute which provided that local housing commissioners
could petition in equity when relief at law was inadequate." When statutes
give local officials authority to petition in equity, equity courts will not only
issue injunctions but will also appoint receivers of slum property." Equity
courts have long considered that the power to issue receivership certificates,
a matter of judicial discretion, was inherent in the power to appoint a re-
ceiver."'
When issuance of certificate has been contested by displaced lienors, how-
ever, appellate courts have looked only to see if the issuance was an abuse
of the lower court's discretion under the facts of the particular case. It has
generally been held that if the certificates are to take preference over exist-
ing liens, the permission of mortgagees and other lienors must first be given.62
Such permission will doubtless not be obtained in slum receivership cases.
However, two lines of cases have carved out exceptions to this general prop-
osition-those involving businesses which are public in character, 3 especially
55. 1 R. CLARK, RECIvERS § 46a (3d ed. 1959).
56. Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L. Rav. 801, 826
(1965).
57. 1 R. CLARK, supra note 55, § 65.
58. See 6 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 20.33 (3d ed. 1949).
59. Ill. Laws 1953, § 23-70.3, at 1112 (repealed 1961).
60. Note, Urban Renewal: Problems of Eliminating and Preventing Urban Deterio-
ration, 72 HARv. L. REv. 504, 548 (1959).
61. 2 R. CLARK, supra note 55, § 455.
62. Id. at § 470.
63. Wallace v. Loomis, 97 U.S. 146 (1878); Smith v. Shenandoah Valley Nat'l Bank,
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railroads, and those in which the preservation of the property in receivership
is at stake. 4
The property of a railroad during bankruptcy or foreclosure proceedings
is sometimes placed in the hands of a receiver who operates the railroad in
the public interest and maintains the equipment and franchise of the com-
pany. The continued operation of the line is financed by the profits, and,
if any deficit occurs, by the issuance of receivership certificates which take
priority over existing liens with or without the consent of the lienors.
Courts reason that the importance of railroads to the public justifies this
interference with the contract rights of mortgagees and lienors6 The New
Mexico Supreme Court has upheld the issuance of receivership certificates as
preference liens under a state statute which provides for the operation of a
railway by a receiver to test the solvency of the line when its owners claim
that its operation is unprofitable." The language in other cases qualifies
the issuance of certificates to those instances in which it is in the best in-
terests of all parties." If this means that the public interest might on oc-
casion be subordinated to protect the individual interest of a single lienor,
these cases are probably anomalies. Two cases involving preference lien
receivership certificates issued by the receiver of a railroad have been before
the United States Supreme Court; both times equity courts were found to
have acted within their legitimate powers. 8 But a federal district court,
in a case involving an irrigation corporation, held that when the renovation
costs would completely destroy a mortgagee's interest, it would be inju-
dicious for an equity court to authorize the issuance of preference lien cer-
tificates. 9
246 Fed. 379 (4th Cir. 1917) ; Meyer v. Johnston, 53 Ala. 237 (1875) ; Cox v. Snow, 47
Idaho 229, 273 Pac. 933 (1929); Equitable Trust Co. v. Chicago, P. & St. L.R.R.,
223 Ill. App. 445 (1921); Weaver v. Pacific Improvement Co., 234 N.Y. 418, 138 N.E.
42 (1923); Vilas v. Page, 106 N.Y. 439, 13 N.E. 743 (1887); State v. Iman Mining
Co., 144 W. Va. 46, 106 S.E.2d 97 (1958).
64. Woodbury v. Pickering Lumber Co., 1 F. Supp. 92 (W.D. Mo. 1932); Pemberton
Lumber & Millwork Indus. v. Ridgway Constr. Co., 38 N.J. Super. 383, 118 A.2d
873 (Ch. 1955); Royer v. New Upper Lehigh Coal Co., 33 Luz. L. Reg. 425 (Pa. C.P.
1939); McDermott v. Pentress Gas Co., 82 W. Va. 230, 95 S.E. 841 (1918).
65. See Wallace v. Loomis, 97 U.S. 146, 162 (1878); Smith v. Shenandoah Valley
Nat'l Bank, 246 Fed. 379, 381 (4th Cir. 1917); State v. Iman Mining Co., 144 W. Va.
46, 56, 106 S.E.2d 97, 98 (1958).
66. Santa Fe, S.J. & N.R.R. v. Helmick, 36 N.M. 157, 9 P.2d 695 (1932).
67. Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 136 (1881); Cody Trust Co. v. Hotel Clayton
Co., 293 Ill. App. 1, 11, 12 N.E.2d 32, 39 (1937); Equitable Trust Co. v. Chicago, P. &
St. L.R.R., 223 Ill. App. 445, 449 (1921).
68. Miltenberger v. Logansport R.R., 106 U.S. 286 (1882); Wallace v. Loomis, 97
U.S. 146 (1878).
69. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Burbank Power & Water Co., 196 Fed. 539 (E. D.
Wash. 1912).
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When the preservation of property in a receiver's custody is at stake,
another line of cases70 allows the issuance of receivership certificates which
take precedence over an existing lien without the lienor's consent. In cases
involving preservation, there is no requirement that the property be public
in nature."' Some courts require that the property of the insolvent be in
imminent danger of destruction before any receivership certificates may be
issued to protect it.7 Other courts are less stringent, holding that receiver-
ship certificates can be used to finance maintenance which preserves the
status quo. 3 On the other hand, the word "preservation" has been con-
strued as encompassing the completion of construction of houses begun
by a corporation which has become bankrupt.7 " A liberal interpretation of
"preservation" might support the issuance of prior lien receivership certifi-
cates to finance repairs of slum dwellings, especially when a failure to repair
would cause a city condemnation proceeding. Such a holding would be
consistent with the usual justification for the issuance of primary lien re-
ceivership certificates in preservation cases; i.e., that the repairs are actually
in the interest of lienors since such expenditures "preserve" the value of their
collateral.
A 1965 amendment to the Illinois law discussed above gives the court
which appoints a receiver under the statute the power to authorize receiver-
ship certificates which take preference over all prior encumbrances. 5 The
fact that the Illinois legislature felt it necessary to give express authority to
the equity courts to issue preference lien certificates indicates a belief that
without this authority equity courts would be unable to displace existing
liens. At least, such statutory authority should mean that appellate courts
will be less likely to find that a lower court has abused its discretion in au-
thorizing a preference lien.
Will the impairment clause of the Constitution be a decisive argument
for those whose liens are displaced by court-authorized receivership certif-
icates? There is some question whether the impairment clause is even ap-
plicable to receivership certificates. The impairment clause is generally
70. Woodbury v. Pickering Lumber Co., 1 F. Supp. 92 (W.D. Mo. 1932); Pem-
berton Lumber & Millwork Indus. v. Ridgway Constr. Co., 38 N.J. Super. 383, 118 A.2d
873 (Ch. 1955); Royer v. New Upper Lehigh Coal Co., 33 Luz. L. Reg. 425 (Pa. C.P.
1939); McDermott v. Pentress Gas Co., 82 W. Va. 230, 95 S.E. 941 (1918).
71. See 2 R. CLARK, supra note 55, § 470(c).
72. Clifford v. West Hartford Creamery Co., 103 Vt. 229, 153 At!. 205 (1931).
73. Oldroyd v. McCrea, 65 Utah 142, 235 Pac. 580 (1935); McDermott v. Pentress
Gas Co., 82 W. Va. 230, 95 S.E. 841 (1918).
74. Pemberton Lumber & Millwork Indus. v. Ridgway Constr. Co., 38 N.J. Super.
393, 118 A.2d 873 (1955).
75. ILL. ANN STAT. § 11-31-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965).
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applied only to legislative acts and not to court actions,7 0 lest every contract
case become a federal question. It is the province of the equity court, within
its inherent power, to authorize the issuance of preference lien certificates;
and it would seem that the impairment clause should not apply to such
court actions. Only one case has been discovered in which the impairment of
contracts argument has been discussed. An 1857 New York supreme court
case held that the issuance of prior lien receivership certificates impaired
the obligations of a contract,77 but the court seemed to be under the im-
pression that the impairment clause applies to court actions as well as sta-
tutes.7 8 The majority view today is definitely to the contrary.7
Problems may arise when, as in Illinois, state legislation expressly pro-
vides for the displacement of existing encumbrances by receivership certif-
icates to remedy housing code violations. Although the actual decision to
issue such certificates is left to the courts, the authority to do so rests on a
legislative act. Some United States Supreme Court cases, 0 though factually
not in point, contain broad language to the effect that a court decision
which gives effect to a legislative enactment is subject to the limitations of
the impairment clause. In Illinois, the courts will obviously be giving effect
to a statute when authorizing receivership certificates. If before the enact-
ment of a statute when authorizing the issuance of certificates in slum hous-
ing cases, equity courts refused to allow such issuances, it would seem that
the act displacing existing liens was essentially that of the legislature, not the
court. If the impairment clause is found applicable, the arguments against
applying to municipal slum repair laws should apply to receivership certif-
icates as well.
SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE
The failure to enforce housing codes effectively has been described as
one of the major factors in the deterioration of urban areas. To combat
this problem, some states have provided for direct municipal repair laws
and receivership certificates programs. Since city governments cannot afford
to defray the costs of rehabilitating large amounts of slum property, the use
of liens which can be foreclosed if a recalcitrant owner refuses to pay for
necessary repairs is essential. However, slum property is invariably heavily
mortgaged, making any secondary repair lien virtually worthless. Thus the
76. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 841 (1952).
77. Patten v. Accessory Transit Co., 13 How. Pr. 502 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857).
78. Id.
79. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 841 (1952).
80. Columbia R.R., Gas, & Elec. Co. v. South Carolina, 261 U.S. 236, 247 (1922);
Detroit United Ry. v. Michigan, 242 U.S. 238 (1916); Cross Lake Shooting & Fishing
Club v. Louisiana, 224 U.S. 632, 638-39 (1912).
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efficacy of these programs depends on the extent to which repair liens are
allowed to displace prior liens on slum property."'
The major obstacle to the displacement of prior liens by a direct mu-
nicipal repair law has been the impairment of the obligations of contracts
clause of the federal constitution. Although Central Savings held New
York's direct municipal repair law unconstitutional, 2 its present-day effect
on the constitutionality of slum repair liens which displace prior liens is
unclear for a number of reasons.
First, the New York statute was held unconstitutional because it did not
provide the mortgagee with notice and an opportunity to be heard. 3 This
legislative oversight was corrected in the 1962 New York slum repair law
which gave the mortgagee notice of the proceedings and the opportunity to
contest the appointment of a receiver.8 ' This provision was held to satisfy
any due process objections of displaced mortgagees."5
Secondly, it is impossible to determine the effect of the retroactive appli-
cation of the 1937 statute in Central Savings. Thus, the constitutionality
of a repair law which would replace only liens arising after the enactment
of the statute was not litigated. Certainly, the effect of such a statute on a
mortgagee would be less harsh. However, a slum repair law given only pro-
spective effect would be ineffective as a means of alleviating the conditions
in existing slum property, most of which is heavily mortgaged. Yet, even
a prospective law would be of some value, since it could be applied to
property which is not mortgaged at the time of passage of the statute and
would cetainly serve as a deterrent to the formation of future slum areas.
In addition, New York cases have held consitutional statutes authorizing
preference liens for expenes incurred in demolishing unsafe buildings 6 and
repairing railroad crossings." These holdings cast additional doubt on the
validity of the Central Savings case. To the extent that these decisions dis-
tinguish Central Savings on the ground that a mortgage could contemplate
a measure to demolish unsafe buildings or repair dangerous grade crossings,
but not one to repair slum property, they are unconvincing. Since all these
measures involve attempts to protect the public from unsafe conditions, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to understand why one provision is more easily
81. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
82. Central Say. Bank v. City of New York, 279 N.Y. 266, 18 N.E.2d. 151, opinion
amended, 280 N.Y. 9, 19 N.E.2d 659, cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1939).
83. Id.
84. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 309 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
85 In re Department of Bldgs., 14 N.Y.2d 291, 200 N.E.2d 432, 251 N.Y.S.2d 441
(1964).
86. Thornton v. Chase, 175 Misc. 748, 23 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
87. State v. Gebhardt, 151 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1945).
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anticipated than another. This is especially true when the slum repair law
requires that a structure be in such a deteriorated condition that it endangers
the health and safety of its occupants--a condition which is also a prerequi-
site to the demolition of property.
Yet, even if one grants that a mortgagee who lends money with a dilapi-
dated dwelling house as collateral cannot anticipate a slum repair law, the
question remains whether the inability of the mortgagee to expect this type
of program should control in these cases. When property is infested with
rats and vermin, has unsanitary toilet facilities, has no locks for individual
apartments, has inadequate fire escapes, and has large holes in plastered
walls and ceilings, the naivete of a mortgagee in failing to foresee stringent
corrective measures should hardly be a controlling factor in determining the
constitutionality of measures to eliminate these hazards. A program to reno-
vate blighted areas is certainly as important to the public welfare as repair-
ing dangerous railroad crossings, and ought equally to justify the displace-
ment of contract rights.
The present status of the Central Savings case is also greatly affected by
In re Department of Buildings,"' which held New York's 1962 repair law
constitutional. The cases are, of course, distinguishable because the statute
in In re Department of Buildings authorized preference liens only on the
rents of slum property. Such a statute is much less burdensome on a dis-
placed mortgagee than is a law which allows a preference lien on the entire
property. Thus, in any discussion of the effect of this case on Central Sav-
ings, this distinction must be borne in mind.
It is important to note, however, that the lien arising out of the repairs in
In re Department of Buildings was allowed to displace a lien in existence at
the time the statute was passed. The statute was applied retroactively de-
spite the language in Central Savings which indicated that the retroactive
application of the 1937 statute was an important factor in holding it uncon-
stitutional."9 Furthermore, the court made it clear that it felt it was engaged
in a balancing process, and that the seriousness of urban blight in 1964-
as compared with that of 1938-was a sufficient reason for tipping the scales
in favor of the repair law. This case then offers some support for a retro-
active statute establishing priority liens on the entire property. The impor-
tance of such a lien cannot be overemphasized. A lien limited to the rents
of the rehabilitated property often will not provide sufficient funds to meet
the costs of rehabilitation. At best such a lien will delay the recovery of the
88. 14 N.Y.2d 291, 200 N.E.2d 432, 251 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1964).
89. Central Say. Bank v. City of New York, 279 N.Y. 266, 280-81, 18 N.E.2d 151,
156-57, opinion amended, 280 N.Y. 9, 19 N.E.2d 659, cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1939).
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rehabilitation costs for a considerable period, thus reducing the funds avail-
able for future rehabilitation.
Although the impairment clause is a significant stumbling block when a
slum repair measure takes the form of a direct municipal repair law, it is
much less of an obstacle when the measure in question involves the issuance
of receivership certificates by a court of equity.9" The problem arises only
when the court's jurisdiction is based on a statute. When statutory authority
is invoked, the same principles which determine the constitutionality of
municipal repair laws under the impairment clause should be applied to
determine the statute's constitutionality.
The central problem regarding the issuance of receivership certificates is
whether an equity court, in the exercise of its discretion, should allow a
receivership lien to displace prior liens. Equity courts have been willing to
allow the displacement of liens when the businesses involved were public in
character and when the preservation of the property in question was at
stake.9 The rationale behind these decisions lies in the courts' belief that
the public interest in these areas is sufficient to justify the displacement of
prior liens. These cases should be sufficient authority for the displacement
of liens by receivership certificates. Even though a landlord who avoids
compliance with basic health, sanitation, and safety standards does not
create a problem of public proportions, avoidance begets avoidance. Soon
other landlords in the neighborhood may allow their properties to deterio-
rate. Deteriorating properties constitute, of course, the core of city slums.
If equity courts are willing to characterize the continued operation of the
country's railroads as essential to the public interest, they should have no
problem finding that the adequate maintenance of low income housing is
just as vital to the public interest.
A provision allowing preference liens for the costs of repairing slum
dwellings may cause hardships to some mortagees. Little sympathy can be
given one who extends credit on a structure which is in an advanced state
of disrepair at the time of the loan. However, suppose a lender accepts as
security a building which, at the time the loan is made, is in excellent con-
dition and is located in a neighborhood of similar structures. It may offend
some to allow such a mortgagee's lien to be displaced if the property falls
into disrepair ten years later. The slum repair law could be drafted to apply
only to properties which violate the housing code at the time of enactment.
But this would negate one of the principal purposes of a slum repair law-
the prevention of the spread of blight in the core city.
90. For a discussion of the impairments issue in certificates cases, see notes 76-80
supra and accompanying text.
91. Notes 62-73 supra and accompanying text.
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However, a mortagee is not without a means of protecting himself in this
situation. He may condition the mortgage on a guarantee that housing
code regulations will be complied with for the duration of the mortgage. A
property owner would thus be under pressure to maintain his property from
a private source-the mortgagee. This solution is not without its potential
drawbacks; it may tend to curb the availability of credit to property owners
in an already tight money market. Thus, the slum repair law could actually
hinder the most basic means of housing code enforcement-self compliance
by property owners.
However, if borrowed money is used for the repair of slum property, lend-
ers should have little fear that the appointment of a receiver will be needed.
Nevertheless, if it is found that a slum repair law greatly hinders sincere
property owners in obtaining loans to finance the repair of slum property,
perhaps liens created to pay for improvements to dilapidated buildings
should be made an exception to the general rule allowing displacement of
prior liens. However, since such an exception would be a potential loop-
hole for those who wish to avoid compliance with housing codes, it should
be made only upon a showing that the law is limiting the availability of such
loans.
No one will dispute the fact that it is desirable that the priority of liens
be stable so business transactions can be made with certainty. But, the
displacement of liens under a receivership or municipal repair program will
be no more disruptive than displacement because of property taxes, demoli-
tion laws, mechanics' liens laws, and public improvement assessments, all of
which have been upheld as constitutional even when applied retroactively.
Preference liens to cover the expenses of municipal repair or receiver-
ship programs would be an effective method of accomplishing the goals of
housing code enforcement. Ramshackle property would be repaired, and
knowledge of expenses incurred by the owners of the repaired property
would probably encourage other owners to repair their properties to avoid
municipal action. Both programs should be held constitutional. They
would not be a complete panacea for the urban slum problem; no one pro-
gram could be. However, preference lien provisions to insure the solvency
of local slum repair programs could be one of the most effective means of
supplementing the urban renewal and public housing efforts.
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